Social choice and the indexing dilemma by Fleurbaey, Marc
Social choice and the indexing dilemma
Marc Fleurbaey
To cite this version:
Marc Fleurbaey. Social choice and the indexing dilemma. 2006. <halshs-00121371>
HAL Id: halshs-00121371
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00121371
Submitted on 20 Dec 2006
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Social choice and the indexing dilemma∗
Marc Fleurbaey†
March 2006
Abstract
This paper distinguishes an index ordering and a social ordering
function as a simple way to formalize the indexing problem in the
social choice framework. Two main conclusions are derived. First,
the alleged dilemma between welfarism and perfectionnism is shown
to involve a third possibility, exemplified by the fairness approach to
social choice. Second, the idea that an individual is better oﬀ than
another whenever he has more (goods, functionings...) in all dimen-
sions, which is known to enter in conflict with the Pareto principle,
can be partly salvaged by adopting the fairness approach.
1 Introduction
All theories of justice involve interpersonal comparisons and have a diﬃculty
in precisely defining how such comparisons must be performed. This is es-
pecially true for non-welfarist theories, such as Rawls’s in which individual
situations are measured in terms of primary goods. Here is an important pas-
sage in which Rawls describes the problem, identifies some simplifications,
and suggests a solution.
“One problem clearly is the construction of the index of primary
social goods. Assuming that the two principles of justice are serially
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Tungodden and the participants at the Philosophical Aspects of Social Choice conference
in Caen.
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ordered, this problem is greatly simplified. The basic liberties are al-
ways equal, and there is fair equality opportunity; one does not need
to balance these liberties and rights against other values. The primary
social goods that vary in their distribution are the rights and prerog-
atives of authority, and income and wealth. But the diﬃculties are
not so great as they might seem at first because of the nature of the
diﬀerence principle. The only index problem that concerns us is that
for the least advantaged group. The primary goods enjoyed by other
representative individuals are adjusted to raise this index, subject of
course to the usual constraints. It is unnecessary to define weights for
the more favored positions in any detail, as long as we are sure that
they are more favored. But often this is easy since they frequently
have more of each primary good that is distributed unequally. If we
know how the distribution of goods to the more favored aﬀects the
expectations of the most disfavored, this is suﬃcient. The index prob-
lem largely reduces, then, to that of weighting primary goods for the
least advantaged. We try to do this by taking up the standpoint of
the representative individual from this group and asking which combi-
nation of primary social goods it would be rational for him to prefer.
In doing this we admittedly rely upon intuitive estimates. But this
cannot be avoided entirely.” (Rawls 1999, p. 80)
The first simplification mentioned by Rawls is that some dimensions (ba-
sic liberties, fair opportunities) have absolute priority and the corresponding
goods must be equally distributed. The second simplification, which will be
the focus of the second part of this paper, is that the better-oﬀ usually have
more of each primary good. It then remains to weight the primary goods for
the worse-oﬀ only, and for this Rawls suggests to rely on “representative”
preferences of this subgroup of the population. This suggestion is however
vague and seems to involve a kind of averaging.
In a famous comment, Arrow expressed scepticism about this suggestion.
“So long as there is more than one primary good, there is an index-
number problem in commensurating the diﬀerent goods, which is in
principle as diﬃcult as the problem of interpersonal comparability
with which we started” (Arrow 1973, p. 254).
An exchange between Kolm and Rawls on this issue is illuminating. Kolm
(1972) proposed to tackle the comparison problem by relying on “fundamen-
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tal preferences”, that is, preferences over personal characteristics in addition
to external goods. Rawls firmly rejected this idea.
“The notion of a shared highest-order preference function is plainly
incompatible with the conception of a well-ordered society in justice
as fairness. For in the circumstances of justice citizen’s conceptions of
the good are not only said to be opposed but to be incommensurable.”
(Rawls 1982, p. 179) “To an economist (...) an index of primary goods
may seem merely ad hoc patchwork not amenable to theory. (...) The
economist’s reaction is partly right: an index of primary goods does
not belong to theory in the economist’s sense. It belongs instead to
a conception of justice which falls under the liberal alternative to the
tradition of the one rational good. Thus the problem is not how to
specify an accurate measure of some psychological or other attribute
available only to science. Rather, it is a moral and practical problem.”
(pp. 184-185)
This explanation is quite interesting. Rawls rejects the idea that in-
terpersonal comparisons of bundles of primary goods could be based on a
theoretical notion of utility or well-being, and makes it clear that the index
must instead reflect ethical priorities in the practical problem of sharing re-
sources. In other words, fairness considerations should somehow determine
the construction of the index.1
This is however insuﬃcient to address Arrow’s challenge. Arneson (1990)
adds a dramatic flavor to this issue, in the form of a dilemma. If, as sug-
gested by Rawls himself, the index assigns the same weights to the various
primary goods in all individual bundles, independently of the diverse per-
sonal preferences, then one can consider this imposition of external weights
as a kind of perfectionnism. Assuming that the weights are faithful to the
preferences of a “representative” individual of the worse-oﬀ group, those with
non-representative preferences may indeed complain that the evaluation of
their personal situation is submitted to someone else’s conception of the good
1Robbins (1932) defended the more radical thesis that the measurement of interperson-
ally comparable utility itself is necessarily plagued with value judgments, without however
precisely describing the substance of such value judgments. Here Rawls embraces the idea
that (a particular kind of) value judgments must shape the index. One also finds the re-
lated idea that fairness principles would make it possible to “pair” the indiﬀerence curves
of diﬀerent individuals in Bergson (1954).
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life. The alternative is to make the index depend precisely on everyone’s pref-
erences, but then Rawls’s resourcist approach seems bound to dissolve into
a kind of welfarism.
This alleged dilemma is the main topic of this paper. In a remarkable
comment, Roemer objects to it.
“Arneson is not right to conclude that the Rawlsian view must
dissolve into welfarism —in particular, into equalizing (or maximin-
ning) welfare. There may be room for a theory which chooses indices
of primary goods which are ordinally equivalent to welfare... Such a
theory would not be welfarist, as these indices need not be recoverable
from information on welfare levels. The task for a Rawlsian must be
to find such indices which are justifiable without appeal to a perfec-
tionist standard or to the inherent superiority of some life plans over
others.” (Roemer 1996, pp. 171-172)
Roemer does not substantiate his claim by an example or by precise
suggestions about how to proceed, but this paper will definitely concur with
him in pointing at a third possibility and will flesh it out in a more precise
way.
The first part of this paper analyzes this dilemma. It introduces a sim-
ple formal framework in which an “index ordering” ranks individual situa-
tions, each of which is described by a bundle of goods (or, more generally,
functionings) and by an individual utility function. The welfarist approach
evaluates such situations by the level of utility obtained at the contemplated
bundle, whereas a perfectionnist ordering typically disregards individual pref-
erences and directly focuses on bundles. We will show how the welfarism-
perfectionnism dilemma relates to Arrow’s theorem of social choice and iden-
tify a third possibility, the “fairness approach”, that represents an interesting
way out of the dilemma. The main ideas here are not new, and can be found
for instance in Fleurbaey and Hammond (2004) and Fleurbaey (2003). But
the formal framework introduced here is quite helpful in making the analysis
of the indexing problem more transparent, by contrast with the standard
social choice approach which focuses on the social aggregation problem and
therefore on the construction of a social ordering function rather than an
index of interpersonal comparisons.
The second part of the paper examines the “dominance” principle accord-
ing to which one should always consider that an individual having more than
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another is unambiguously better-oﬀ. This very natural idea, mentioned by
Rawls in the first quotation above, has been eloquently developed by Sen.
“The existence of diﬀerent ends does not, of course, rule out the
possibility that diﬀerent people may have exactly the same ranking of
the diﬀerent means in the form of bundles of primary goods... The
problem of indexing of primary goods bundles would be considerably
simplified if the orderings of these means corresponding to the re-
spective ends had extensive overlaps. The larger the “intersection”,
the greater the possibility of using an agreed index of primary goods
bundles.” (Sen 1991, p. 16)2
A particular case of agreement between individuals, when they have
monotonic preferences, is that a greater bundle is better than a smaller one.
“Having more of each relevant functioning or capability is a clear
improvement, and this is decidable without waiting to get agreement
on the relative weights to be attached to the diﬀerent functionings
and capabilities... The ‘intersection approach’, which articulates only
those judgements that are shared implications of all of the possible
alternative weights, can indeed take us quite a distance” (Sen 1992,
pp. 46-47).
Commenting on Rawls, Sen or other sources, various authors (Gibbard
1979, Basu 1994, Fleurbaey and Trannoy 2003, Brun and Tungodden 2004,
Pattanaik and Xu 2005) have, however, questioned this intuitive idea and
noticed that it can easily lead to a contradiction with the Pareto principle.
In this paper we will rely on the formalism of the index ordering in order
to analyze the problem. Eventually we will relate this dominance-Pareto
dilemma to the welfarism-perfectionnism dilemma studied in the first part of
the paper, and show that the third way identified for the latter, the so-called
fairness approach, can be useful in the search of a reasonable compromise for
the former.
2Rawls (1993) comments on this suggestion in quite favorable terms. “We suppose that
all citizens have a rational plan of life that requires for its fulfillment roughly the same
kind of primary goods... Without assumptions of this kind, the index problem is known
to be insoluble.” (p. 181)
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2 The model
The formalism is reduced to the minimum necessary for the analysis. The
population is made of n ≥ 2 individuals, and is denotedN = {1, ..., n} . Every
individual’s consumption set is X = Rc+, and the c ≥ 2 dimensions may be
interpreted as referring to goods (primary goods or ordinary commodities)
or to functionings more generally. Let X∗ = Rc+ \{0} . Every individual i has
a utility function Ui on X, which is an ordinary utility function measuring
happiness or preference satisfaction. The important point here that this util-
ity function is not necessarily defining the ethical index by which individual
situations are compared. We assume however that this utility function rep-
resents the individual’s preference ordering (an ordering is a complete and
transitive binary relation) that the Pareto principle is meant to sanctify. Let
U be the set of utility functions onX that are continuous, strictly monotonic,
and convex.
A profile of utility functions is denoted U = (U1, ..., Un) and an allocation
is denoted x = (x1, ..., xn), where xi ∈ X denotes individual i’s personal
bundle.
The social choice problem is to define a social ordering function (SOF)
from Un to the set of orderings onXn, which for every profile U determines an
ordering R¯(U) that ranks allocations. The notation x R¯(U) y will mean that
x is weakly better than y. Let P¯ (U) and I¯(U) denote the strict preference
and indiﬀerence counterparts of the ordering, respectively.
The index problem is to define an index ordering < applying to individual
situations (a, u) where a is a bundle from X and u a utility function from
U . Let (xi, Ui) < (xj, Uj) mean that i is at least as well-oﬀ than j, in their
respective situations, and letÂ, ∼ stand for “strictly better-oﬀ” and “equally
well-oﬀ”, respectively.
In this simple model, utility functions and bundles in X are the only
possible diﬀerences between individuals (apart from their labels 1, ..., n). One
might imagine a richer structure in which, for instance, personal resources
(or characteristics) would be distinguished from external resources. This is
not needed for the purpose of this analysis.
This simple way of formalizing the index problem can be compared to
related approaches in the literature. The special theory of social choice that
focuses the informational basis of interpersonal comparisons standardly as-
sumes that the index problem has been solved and focuses on the social
aggregation problem. In the most common framework, introduced in Sen
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(1970) and developed later by him and many authors, it assumes that indi-
vidual utility functions, or families thereof, do embody the ethical indexes
on which comparisons can be made. In a diﬀerent framework, also developed
by the same group of authors, there is an “extended sympathy” index that
compares extended alternatives (x, i) where x is e.g. an allocation and i is an
individual. This framework is not so diﬀerent as such an index can typically
be represented by comparable utility functions.
Social choice theory assumes that such methods of interpersonal com-
parisons are available and examines the possibilities of social aggregation
depending on the properties of such indexing methods. In contrast, the
framework of this paper enables us to study the construction of the index,
by imposing some ethical requirements on this index itself, and also possibly
on the social aggregation that might rely on the index. In particular, it leaves
it open whether the ethical index should rely on utility values or not.
3 The social choice approach
We first rehearse particular versions of the fundamental results of social
choice, for this framework, in order to set the stage for the rest of the analysis.
The following requirements imposed on the SOF R¯ do not directly refer
to the indexing problem, but can indirectly be interpreted in these terms.
Pareto axioms convey the idea that for any given individual, his own pref-
erences should determine how his situation is evaluated. The independence
axiom means that utility levels at a particular situation contain the relevant
information, at the exclusion of utility levels at other alternatives. The ordi-
nality axiom adds that only ordinal preferences should be taken into account,
at the exclusion of utility numbers. These two axioms together form a log-
ical decomposition of Arrow’s independence axiom according to which the
ranking of two alternatives should only depend on how they are ranked in
individual preference orderings.3
Weak Pareto: ∀x, y ∈ Xn, ∀U ∈ Un,
if ∀i ∈ N, Ui(xi) > Ui(yi),
then x P¯ (U) y.
3See Fleurbaey and Hammond (2003) or Fleurbaey and Mongin (2005) for a detailed
discussion of this point.
7
Pareto Indiﬀerence: ∀x, y ∈ Xn, ∀U ∈ Un,
if ∀i ∈ N, Ui(xi) = Ui(yi),
then x I¯(U) y.
Independence of Irrelevant Utilities: ∀x, y ∈ Xn, ∀U,U 0 ∈ Un,
if ∀i ∈ N, Ui(xi) = U 0i(xi) and Ui(yi) = U 0i(yi),
then x R¯(U) y ⇔ x R¯(U 0) y.
Ordinal Non-Comparability: ∀U,U 0 ∈ Un,
if ∀i ∈ N, Ui and U 0i are ordinally equivalent,
then R¯(U) = R¯(U 0).
The proof of the two theorems below can be found, for this setting, in
Bordes and Le Breton (1989). The first is a version of Arrow’s theorem. The
second replaces Weak Pareto by Pareto Indiﬀerence, and is a direct corollary
of Wilson’s theorem.
Theorem 1 If R¯ satisfies Ordinal Non-Comparability, Weak Pareto and
Independence of Irrelevant Utilities, then there exists i0 ∈ N such that:
∀x, y ∈ (X∗)n , ∀R ∈ D, if xi0 Pi0 yi0, then x P¯ (R) y.
Theorem 2 If R satisfies Ordinal Non-Comparability, Pareto Indiﬀerence
and Independence of Irrelevant Utilities, then one of the three following as-
sertions is true:
(i) ∀x, y ∈ (X∗)n , ∀R ∈ D, x I¯(R) y;
(ii) ∀x, y ∈ (X∗)n , ∀R ∈ D, if xi0 Pi0 yi0 , then x P¯ (R) y;
(iii) ∀x, y ∈ (X∗)n , ∀R ∈ D, if xi0 Pi0 yi0 , then y P¯ (R)x.
4 A simple formulation of the indexing prob-
lem
As mentioned in the previous section, the standard axioms of social choice
bear on the social aggregation problem and only indirectly impose conditions
on interpersonal comparisons. We now introduce axioms that bear directly on
the index ordering. As it turns out, the Pareto, independence and ordinality
conditions have immediate translations in this setting.
The Pareto axioms below state that the evaluation of individual situations
should respect individual preferences, without implying anything about social
evaluations.
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∼Weak Pareto: ∀a, b ∈ X, ∀u ∈ U ,
if u(a) > u(b), then (a, u) Â (b, u) .
∼Pareto Indiﬀerence: ∀a, b ∈ X, ∀u ∈ U ,
if u(a) = u(b), then (a, u) ∼ (b, u) .
For later reference, it is also useful to introduce a strong Pareto axiom.
∼Strong Pareto: ∀a, b ∈ X, ∀u ∈ U ,
(a, u) < (b, u) if and only if u(a) ≥ u(b).
The independence axiom now strictly says that the evaluation of individ-
ual situations should be based on utility levels at the contemplated situations
and not on other utility levels.
∼Independence of Irrelevant Utilities: ∀a, b ∈ X, ∀u, u0, v, v0 ∈ U ,
if u(a) = u0(a) and v(b) = v0(b), then (a, u) < (b, v)⇔ (a, u0) < (b, v0) .
Similarly, the ordinality condition now strictly says that preference or-
derings only should guide interpersonal comparisons of situations.
∼Ordinal Non-Comparability: ∀a, b ∈ X, ∀u, u0, v, v0 ∈ U ,
if u and u0 (resp. v and v0) are ordinally equivalent,
then (a, u) < (b, v)⇔ (a, u0) < (b, v0) .
It may be useful to note that the independence and ordinality axioms
have two equivalent and somewhat simpler formulations, as described in the
following lemma.
Lemma 1 ∼Independence of Irrelevant Utilities is equivalent to: ∀a ∈ X,
∀u, u0 ∈ U , if u(a) = u0(a), then (a, u) ∼ (a, u0) .
∼Ordinal Non-Comparability is equivalent to: ∀a ∈ X, ∀u, u0 ∈ U , if u and
u0 are ordinally equivalent, then (a, u) ∼ (a, u0) .
Proof. Suﬃciency is obvious, and we focus on necessity. Let < satisfy ∼IIU,
and let a and u, u0 be such that u(a) = u0(a). By reflexivity, (a, u) ∼ (a, u).
By ∼IIU, (a, u) ∼ (a, u0).
Let< satisfy∼ONC, and let a and u, u0 be such that u and u0 are ordinally
equivalent. By reflexivity, (a, u) ∼ (a, u). By ∼ONC, (a, u) ∼ (a, u0).
The main result of this first part of the paper is the following theorem. It
says that the combination of Pareto, independence and ordinality conditions
at the level of the index ordering is problematic, and leads either to general
indiﬀerence or to an outright impossibility.
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Theorem 3 If < satisfies ∼Pareto Indiﬀerence, ∼Independence of Irrele-
vant Utilities and ∼Ordinal Non-Comparability, then: ∀a, b ∈ X∗, ∀u, v ∈ U ,
(a, u) ∼ (b, v) . If ∼Pareto Indiﬀerence is replaced by ∼Weak Pareto, then
one has an incompatibility.
Proof. First part. Let a, b and u, u0 be such that u(a) = u0(b). Let c and v
be such that u(a) = u(c) = v(c) = v(b). Such a c and v exist since a, b ∈ X∗.
By ∼PI, (a, u) ∼ (c, u) . By ∼IIU (and Lemma 1), (c, u) ∼ (c, v) . By ∼PI,
(c, v) ∼ (b, v) . By ∼IIU (and Lemma 1), (b, v) ∼ (b, u0) . In conclusion,
(a, u) ∼ (b, u0) .
Take any a, b and u, v. Let u0, v0 be such that u and u0 (resp. v and v0) are
ordinally equivalent, while u0(a) = v0(b). By the above fact, (a, u0) ∼ (b, v0) .
By ∼ONC, (a, u) ∼ (b, v) .
Second part. Let a, b and u, u0 be such that u(a) > u0(b). Let c and v be
such that u(a) > u(c) and u(c) = v(c) > v(b) = u0(b). By ∼WP, (a, u) Â
(c, u) . By ∼IIU (and Lemma 1), (c, u) ∼ (c, v) . By ∼WP, (c, v) Â (b, v) . By
∼IIU (and Lemma 1), (b, v) ∼ (b, u0) . In conclusion, (a, u) Â (b, u0) .
Take any a, b and u, v such that u(a) > v(b). Let u0, v0 be such that u and
u0 (resp. v and v0) are ordinally equivalent, while u0(a) < v0(b). By the above
fact, (a, u) Â (b, v) and (a, u0) ≺ (b, v0) . By ∼ONC, this is impossible.
Notice that the proof is incomparably simpler than the proof of the social
choice theorems. It contains a neutrality step that is reminiscent of the
welfarism lemma one encounters in social choice (see d’Aspremont and Gevers
1977, d’Aspremont 1985).
5 Back to social choice
Let us now see how the theorem of the previous section relates to the social
choice theorems. We focus on the second social choice theorem (that involv-
ing Pareto indiﬀerence), for which the connection is more interesting, and
leave it to the reader to examine the first theorem. One can connect the two
kinds of results by means of the following axiom, which requires the SOF R¯
to rely on the index ordering < .4
Pareto Indiﬀerence wrt º: ∀x, y ∈ Xn, ∀U ∈ Un,
if ∀i ∈ N, (xi, Ui) ∼ (yi, Ui) ,
then x I¯(U) y.
4This axiom is reminiscent of the principle of personal good in Broome (1991).
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The three axioms involved in the second social choice theorem can be
derived from this axiom and the conditions imposed on the index ordering,
as detailed in the following proposition, whose immediate proof is omitted.
Proposition 1 If R¯ satisfies Pareto Indiﬀerence wrt an index that satisfies
∼Pareto Indiﬀerence (resp., ∼Independence of Irrelevant Utilities, ∼Ordinal
Non-Comparability), then it satisfies Pareto Indiﬀerence, (resp., Indepen-
dence of Irrelevant Utilities, Ordinal Non-Comparability).
This proposition shows that requiring the SOF to satisfy Pareto Indiﬀer-
ence wrt an index < that satisfies ∼Pareto Indiﬀerence, ∼Independence of
Irrelevant Utilities and ∼Ordinal Non-Comparability is at least as demand-
ing as requiring it to satisfy Pareto Indiﬀerence, Independence of Irrelevant
Utilities and Ordinal Non-Comparability (as in the second social choice theo-
rem). We will see that it is actually more demanding. There is only a partial
converse to this result.
Proposition 2 If R¯ satisfies Pareto Indiﬀerence and Independence of Irrel-
evant Utilities, then it satisfies Pareto Indiﬀerence wrt an index that satisfies
∼Pareto Indiﬀerence and ∼Independence of Irrelevant Utilities.
The index ordering involved in the (immediate) proof of this proposition
is the welfarist ordering <w defined by (a, u) <w (b, v) ⇔ u(a) ≥ v(b). This
index ordering does not satisfy ∼Ordinal Non-Comparability.
The following result is a direct corollary of the theorem of the previous
section, and is an adaptation of the second social choice theorem in our
framework. The dictatorship and anti-dictatorship parts of the latter have
disappeared, which proves that this new version of the social choice result
involves stronger requirements.
Corollary 1 If R¯ satisfies Pareto Indiﬀerence wrt an index < that satisfies
∼Pareto Indiﬀerence, ∼Independence of Irrelevant Utilities and ∼Ordinal
Non-Comparability, then: ∀x, y ∈ Xn, ∀R ∈ D, x I¯(R) y.
Even though this last result tells us nothing really new about the social
choice problem, it may be worthwhile to have a result which clearly separates
the conditions bearing on the social aggregation problem from the conditions
bearing on the index problem. Moreover, with this slightly more demanding
set of requirements (as compared to the second social choice theorem) the
proof of the result is considerably simplified.
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6 A welfarism-perfectionnism dilemma?
Theorem 3 involves three axioms and implies an unappealing index ordering
that is totally unable to discriminate individual situations. Let us examine
the new possibilities that emerge when one of the axioms is relaxed.
Let us first drop ∼Pareto Indiﬀerence. The two other axioms are satisfied
by any index < that is independent of u. That is, for all a ∈ X and u, u0 ∈ U ,
(a, u) ∼ (a, u0) . We will say that an index < is perfectionnist if it is satisfies
this property of being impervious to the concerned individual’s preferences.5
Let us now drop ∼Ordinal Non-Comparability. Then the welfarist index
ordering <w becomes acceptable. We will say that an index < is weakly
welfarist if (a, u) ∼ (b, u0) whenever (a, u) ∼w (b, u0) , and that it is welfarist
if <=<w .
Finally, let us consider dropping ∼Independence of Irrelevant Utilities.
Then one can find examples of admissible index orderings in the fairness
literature. For instance, an egalitarian-equivalent index ordering, inspired by
Pazner and Schmeidler (1978) and Pazner (1979), can be defined by selecting
a fixed bundle x0 and by letting
(a, u) < (b, v)⇐⇒ ∃λ ≥ 0, u(a) ≥ u(λx0) and v(λx0) ≥ v(b).
This index ordering obviously depends only on ordinal preferences, and it
also satisfies ∼Pareto Indiﬀerence since when u(a) = u(b), there exists λ
such that
u(a) = u(b) = u(λx0),
implying (a, u) ∼ (b, u) . The fairness literature contains many other exam-
ples of similar index orderings.6
These three alleys of possibility show that there is no welfarism-perfectionnism
dilemma and confirm Roemer’s statement that a third way is open. The fair-
ness approach to social choice exemplifies this possibility. There is, however,
5One might want to reserve the adjective “perfectionnist” to indexes satisfying more
substantive properties related to ethical norms. The point of this analysis is just to focus
on the property of independence of the index with respect to personal preferences, as in
Arneson (1990).
6The adoption of the social choice methodology in order to derive social ordering func-
tions on the basis of fairness principles has yielded a variety of SOFs for various settings
(see e.g. Fleurbaey and Maniquet 2005, 2006, Fleurbaey 2005). These SOFs all violate
Independence of Irrelevant Utilities (and Arrow’s independence axiom), and this can be
justified by the fact that fairness principles reasonably require using more information
than allowed by such independence requirements.
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a grain of truth in the alleged dilemma. As stated in the following result,
assuming independence it is indeed hard to escape any of the two horns.
Theorem 4 Assume that < satisfies ∼Independence of Irrelevant Utilities.
If it satisfies ∼Pareto Indiﬀerence, then it is weakly welfarist. If it sat-
isfies ∼Strong Pareto, then it is welfarist. If it satisfies ∼Ordinal Non-
Comparability, then it is perfectionnist.
Proof. Let < satisfy ∼IIU and ∼PI. Let a, b and u, u0 be such that u(a) =
u0(b). The proof that (a, u) ∼ (b, u0) is in the beginning of the proof of
Theorem 2.
Let < satisfy ∼IIU and ∼SP. Let a, b and u, u0 such that u(a) > u0(b).
Take v and c such that u(a) = v(a) > v(c) = u0(b). By ∼IIU (and Lemma 1),
(a, u) ∼ (a, v) and by weak welfarism, (c, v) ∼ (b, u0) . By∼SP, (a, v) Â (c, v) .
By transitivity, (a, u) Â (b, u0) .
Let < satisfy ∼IIU and ∼ONC. Take any a and u, u0. Pick v such that
v(a) = u0(a) and u and v are ordinally equivalent. By ∼ONC (and Lemma
1), (a, u) ∼ (a, v). By ∼IIU (and Lemma 1), (a, v) ∼ (a, u0). By transitivity,
(a, u) ∼ (a, u0).
The welfarism-perfectionnism dilemma is therefore real, but only if one
wants to retain the independence requirement. Is such a requirement com-
pelling? The fairness approach strongly suggests that it is not. It may be
quite relevant, for the comparison of two individual situations (a, u) and
(b, v), to know how the individuals rank them with respect to a reference
situation involving a bundle λx0. For instance, suppose that, according to
his own preferences, i is worse-oﬀ at (xi, Ui) than at (Ω/n, Ui), where Ω/n
is the per capita amount of resources to be distributed, and that in con-
trast j is better-oﬀ at (xj, Uj) than at (Ω/n, Uj). Assuming, as in Steinhaus
(1948), that individuals have a right to the per capita amount of resources,
there seems to be a case for arguing that i is less well treated than j, and
is therefore relevantly worse-oﬀ. This kind of evaluation is ruled out by
∼Independence of Irrelevant Utilities and this appears quite questionable.
7 Dominance versus Pareto?
Let us now examine Rawls’s and Sen’s suggestion that partial agreement
between individuals may alleviate the indexing problem. We will focus on
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the minimal version of this intersection approach, namely, the idea that when
one individual has more in all dimensions than another, she is unambiguously
better-oﬀ.
It has already been shown, by Gibbard (1979), Fleurbaey and Trannoy
(2003) and Brun and Tungodden (2004) that, if one relies on this idea in
order to formulate transfer axioms applied to a SOF, such a SOF could not
simultaneously satisfy Pareto requirements. Such transfer axioms say that
when an individual has more of every good than another, then a transfer be-
tween them that does not eliminate this dominance configuration is a social
improvement. These axioms are unfortunately adding an egalitarian require-
ment to the dominance idea. Such a requirement, no matter how compelling,
is logically independent. Once again, it appears useful to focus on the re-
quirements one wants to impose on the index ordering itself rather than on
indirect requirements passing via axioms on SOFs. Let us therefore formu-
late the dominance principle directly as a property of < . More precisely, we
consider the possibility that it applies only on a subset of bundles, A ⊂ X.
∼Dominance on A : ∀a, b ∈ A, ∀u, v ∈ U ,
if aÀ b, then (a, u) Â (b, v) .
Similarly, we reformulate the∼Weak Pareto condition with the possibility
that it applies only to a subset of utility functions, V ⊂ U .
∼Weak Pareto on V: ∀a, b ∈ X, ∀u ∈ V,
if u(a) > u(b), then (a, u) Â (b, u) .
We need a few definitions and pieces of notation. A set A ⊂ X is thin if
for all a, b ∈ A, either a ≥ b or a ≤ b. A set V ⊂ U is thin if for all u, v ∈ V,
u and v are ordinally equivalent. If d denotes the Euclidean distance, then
Bε(a) = {q ∈ X | d(q, a) ≤ ε} .
The following theorem delineates the conflict between Dominance and
Pareto. It shows that for the dominance idea to be satisfied by a Paretian
index, one has to assume not only partial agreement between individuals,
but full agreement over the ranking of all situations (involving bundles in
the subset A). The theorem contains an assumption on A that excludes
degenerate cases in which A would contain only a few scattered points.
Theorem 5 Suppose A is such that for all a ∈ A, ε > 0, there is b ∈ Bε(a)
such that bÀ a, and if aÀ 0, there is c ∈ Bε(a) such that c¿ a.
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(i) If < satisfies ∼Dominance on A and ∼Weak Pareto on U , then A is thin.
(ii) If < satisfies ∼Dominance on X and ∼Weak Pareto on V, then V is
thin.
(iii) If < satisfies ∼Dominance on A and ∼Weak Pareto on V, then for all
a, b ∈ A, u, v ∈ V, u(a) ≥ u(b) if and only v(a) ≥ v(b).
Proof. The first two assertions are corollaries of the last one. Suppose
that there is a, b ∈ A, u, v ∈ V, such that u(a) ≥ u(b) and v(a) < v(b). By
continuity of the utility functions and the assumption on A, one can find
a0 ∈ A, a0 À a such that u(a0) > u(b) and v(a0) < v(b). By continuity of the
utility functions and the assumption on A again, one can find c, d ∈ A such
that c¿ a0, dÀ b and u(c) > u(d). By∼Dominance onA, (d, u) Â (b, v) and
(a0, v) Â (c, u). By ∼Weak Pareto on V, (c, u) Â (d, u) and (b, v) Â (a0, v).
One obtains a cycle:
(d, u) Â (b, v) Â (a0, v) Â (c, u) Â (d, u),
which concludes the proof.
This result questions the intuitive idea that whenever all utility functions
agree that a bundle a is better than a bundle b, one must have (a, u) Â (b, v)
for any pair of functions u, v. If one wants to stick to the Paretian principle
of respect of individual preferences, it seems that the dominance principle
must be seriously watered down. This can be understood as follows. Even if
xi À xj, for instance, it may happen that agent i is far from her ideal mix
of goods, whereas agent j is close to his ideal combination. In such a case,
one could easily improve i’s situation by giving her another bundle yi that
j would consider to be worse than xj. Their diﬀerent preferences, therefore,
make it dubious to compare their situations on the sole basis of physical
dominance of bundles.
8 From dominance to fairness
In this section we examine the connection between the dominance-Pareto
dilemma and the welfarism-perfectionnism-fairness “trilemma”.
Let us first observe that the dominance axiom, by implying comparisons
that are independent of preferences, has a strong connection with perfection-
nism. This can be seen by introducing a continuity condition.
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∼Continuity: ∀a ∈ X, ∀u, v ∈ U , the sets {q ∈ X | (q, v) < (a, u)} and
{q ∈ X | (a, u) < (q, v)} are closed.
Proposition 3 If < satisfies ∼Dominance on X and ∼Continuity, then <
is perfectionnist.
The∼Continuity axiomwould not even be needed if the dominance axiom
was formulated in terms of large inequalities:
a ≥ b⇒ ∀u, v ∈ U , (a, u) < (b, v).
A reasonable solution, if one wants to stick to the Pareto principle but
nonetheless retain as much as possible from the dominance idea, is to restrict
the application of the dominance principle to a thin set of bundles, as in
assertion (i) of Theorem 5. This avoids perfectionnism, and, in the light of
Theorem 3, it remains to see whether one wants to adopt the welfarist or the
fairness approach in the definition of the index.
The next theorem says that the fairness approach is actually the only
possibility. In particular, the dominance idea, even “thinly” applied, then
implies ∼Ordinal Non-Comparability and thereby bars welfarism.
Theorem 6 Suppose A is such that for all a ∈ A, ε > 0, there is b ∈
Bε(a) such that b À a, and if a À 0, there is c ∈ Bε(a) such that c ¿ a.
Suppose moreover that for all a ∈ X, all u ∈ U , there exists b ∈ A such
that u(a) = u(b). If < satisfies ∼Dominance on A, ∼Weak Pareto on U and
∼Continuity, then it also satisfies ∼Ordinal Non-Comparability and violates
∼Independence of Irrelevant Utilities.
Proof. First note that ∼D and∼C imply that for all a ∈ A and all u, u0 ∈ U ,
(a, u) ∼ (a, u0); and that ∼WP and ∼C imply ∼Pareto Indiﬀerence.
Let u, u0 ∈ U be ordinally equivalent and assume that for some a ∈ X,
(a, u) ¿ (a, u0). For instance, (a, u) Â (a, u0). There exists b ∈ A such that
u(b) = u(a) and u0(b) = u0(a). By ∼PI, (b, u) Â (b, u0), which contradicts ∼D
and ∼C.
Let u, u0 ∈ U be such that for some a ∈ X, u(a) = u0(a), while for some
b, b0 ∈ A, b À b0 and u(a) = u(b), u0(a) = u0(b0). By ∼D, (b, u) Â (b0, u0), so
that by ∼PI, (a, u) Â (a, u0), contradicting ∼IIU.
In this result, ∼Continuity can be dropped if one replaces ∼Weak Pareto
by ∼Strong Pareto and ∼Dominance by its version involving large inequali-
ties.
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The fairness approach is therefore singled out as a way to implement a
reasonable compromise between Paretianism and the dominance idea. Ob-
serve, for instance, that the egalitarian-equivalent index given as an example
in Section 6 satisfies ∼Dominance on the thin set of all bundles proportional
to x0.
9 Extension to opportunity sets
The analysis of the Pareto-dominance dilemma can be extended to the case
in which individual situations involve opportunity sets rather than bundles:
(A, u), where A ⊂ X.
Some pieces of notation have to be adapted. Now, A À B means that
for all b ∈ B, there is a ∈ A such that a À b. Similarly, A ≥ B means
that for all b ∈ B, there is a ∈ A such that a ≥ b. One has A ≥ B if and
only if for all u, v ∈ U , u(A) ≥ u(B), where u(A) denotes the indirect utility
obtained from A when maximizing the utility function u. Let X¯ denote the
set of non-empty subsets of X, and A¯ a subset of X¯.
The dominance and Pareto axioms can be reformulated as follows.
∼Dominance on A¯ : ∀A,B ∈ A¯, ∀u, v ∈ U ,
if AÀ B, then (a, u) Â (b, v) .
∼Weak Pareto on V: ∀A,B ∈ X¯, ∀u ∈ V,
if u(A) > u(B), then (A, u) Â (B, u) .
A set A¯ ⊂ X¯ is said to be thin if for all A,B ∈ A¯, either A ≥ B or A ≤ B.
Let
Bε(A) =
[
a∈A
Bε(a).
Theorem 7 Suppose A¯ is such that for all A ∈ A¯, ε > 0, there is B ⊂ Bε(A)
such that B À A, and if AÀ {0} , there is C ⊂ Bε(A) such that C ¿ A.
(i) If < satisfies ∼Dominance on A¯ and ∼Weak Pareto on U , then A¯ is thin.
(ii) If < satisfies ∼Dominance on X and ∼Weak Pareto on V, then V is
thin.
(iii) If < satisfies ∼Dominance on A¯ and ∼Weak Pareto on V, then for all
A,B ∈ A¯, u, v ∈ V, u(A) ≥ u(B) if and only v(A) ≥ v(B).
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Proof. The proof mimics that of Theorem 5. Suppose that there isA,B ∈ A¯,
u, v ∈ V such that u(A) ≥ u(B) and v(A) < v(B). By continuity of the utility
functions and the assumption on A¯, one can find A0 ∈ A¯, A0 À A such that
u(A0) > u(b) and v(A0) < v(B). By continuity of the utility functions and the
assumption on A¯ again, one can find C,D ∈ A¯ such that C ¿ A0,DÀ B and
u(C) > u(D). By ∼Dominance on A¯, (D,u) Â (B, v) and (A0, v) Â (C, u).
By ∼Weak Pareto on V, (C, u) Â (D, u) and (B, v) Â (A0, v). One again
obtains a cycle.
From the formal point of view, this extension to sets is immediate. One
may, however, wonder if the axioms retain the same value in this setting.
When dealing with sets, one might, in particular, think that the dominance
idea becomes more compelling while the Pareto axiom is less so. As Basu
(1994) notices, even the “Chicago school” defended the idea that two indi-
viduals are equally well-oﬀ if they choose in the same set, independently of
their preferences:
∀A ⊂ X, ∀u, v ∈ U , (A, u) ∼ (A, v).
While Basu shows that this idea conflicts with the Pareto criterion, we may
note that this idea is the extension to sets of the above definition of perfec-
tionnism, but seems less perfectionnist than in the bundle formulation.
It does not appear, however, that this kind of consideration makes the
dominance idea immune to a problematic conflict with the Paretian idea of
respecting individual preferences. After all, why should individuals not have
a say in determining the shape of their opportunity sets, and why could their
preferences be disregarded in this context? Truly enough, it may be less bad
to give an individual a badly composed opportunity set than to give him
a poor bundle, because the opportunity set still oﬀers some choice. But it
would obviously be even better to make the contents of the opportunity set
reflect the orientation of the agent’s preferences. In conclusion, the dilemma
between dominance and Pareto, which can be settled in favor of Pareto in the
bundle framework, should not be settled in favor of dominance when dealing
with opportunity sets. A thin version of dominance seems to be warranted
in this case as well.
A closely related analysis of the dominance idea is made in Pattanaik
and Xu (2005). These authors do not introduce the Pareto axiom, but focus
on a crucial consequence of the Pareto axiom when agents have diﬀerent
preferences, namely, that it may happen that a bundle or a set is better
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than another when they are given to agent i, while the reverse ranking would
prevail for another agent j. They show that this occurrence is incompatible
with the dominance axiom.
10 Conclusion
The theory of social choice has generally focused on the social aggregation
problem, and has only indirectly touched upon the indexing problem, by
looking at the consequences of properties of the index of interpersonal com-
parisons over the possibilities of social orderings, or by examining transfer
axioms that added distributional preferences to comparative evaluations of
individual situations. In this paper, a very simple formalism distinguishing
the social ordering function and the index ordering has made it possible to
formulate axioms bearing on the latter object and to study the construction
of interpersonal comparisons on the basis of various kinds of information,
namely, utility levels, indiﬀerence curves, dominance of bundles or sets.
Two well-known diﬃculties in the indexing problem have been analyzed
in this light. First, the welfarism-perfectionnism dilemma has been shown to
involve a third possibility, the fairness approach, which embraces Paretianism
without relying on interpersonally comparable utility information. Second,
the Pareto-dominance dilemma has been shown to be rather severe, although
retaining the full force of the Pareto principle still makes it possible to apply
the dominance principle in a restricted way. The two diﬃculties have been
shown to be connected, and the compromise proposed for the latter singles
out the fairness approach as a way to implement it. The fairness approach
therefore emerges from this analysis as a way to combine the Paretian respect
for individual preferences, the strict use of ordinal non-comparable informa-
tion about preferences, and a maximal application of the dominance principle
that is compatible with Pareto.
The literature contains numerous illustrations showing another feature
of this approach that actually gives it its name, that is, the fact that it
incorporates a variety of fairness principles which determine not only the
method of social aggregation but also the precise way in which individual
situations are measured and compared. In this way, the fairness approach
fleshes out Rawls’s rather enigmatic claim that the indexing problem “is not
how to specify an accurate measure of some psychological or other attribute
available only to science. Rather, it is a moral and practical problem.”
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